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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants Eugene Ruocchio and Robert A. D'Angiolillo, 
members of the United Transportation Union ("UTU"), 
appeal the District Court's dismissal of their action against 
appellee UTU and its local chapter and chairperson. 
Ruocchio was suspended from his position as treasurer of 
the local chapter, UTU Local 60, when he was charged with 
"willfully circularizing untrue statements" in violation of 
Article 78 of the UTU constitution. Ruocchio filed suit 
against the UTU, Local 60, and Donald Bogen, the General 
Chairperson of Local 60, alleging that the charges against 
him violated Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), seeking reinstatement to his 
position, and requesting various forms of injunctive and 
declaratory relief, as well as money damages and attorney's 
fees. The District Court, while retaining jurisdiction, 
determined not to proceed to entertain the action until after 
the union's internal procedure was complete. Although the 
union Trial Board found that Ruocchio had violated Article 
78 and removed him from office, its ruling was overturned 
by the UTU's International President during the internal 
union appeals process and Ruocchio was reinstated as 
treasurer. The District Court then dismissed Ruocchio's 
action as moot, finding that, in light of Ruocchio's 
reinstatement as treasurer, no case or controversy existed. 
Ruocchio filed the instant appeal. We find that Ruocchio's 
complaint is not moot, and remand to the District Court for 
further proceedings in light of this opinion. 
 




Eugene Ruocchio and Robert A. D'Angiolillo are members 
of the UTU and its local chapter, UTU Local 60. Ruocchio 
also served as treasurer of Local 60, having been elected 
with support from D'Angiolillo. As treasurer, Ruocchio was 
responsible for depositing a refund check for overpayment 
Local 60 received from Vernay Moving, Inc., a moving 
company that had moved Local 60 into new offices. 
Ruocchio claims that he was unable to deposit Vernay's 
original refund check, dated May 28, 1997, because it was 
not made out to the union, but to Local 60's secretary, 
Susan Bogen, who also is the wife of Local 60's General 
Chairperson, Donald Bogen. To resolve this problem, 
Ruocchio requested Susan Bogen to ask Vernay to prepare 
another check, this time made out to Local 60. The record 
reflects that Susan Bogen did so, in a letter to Vernay dated 
July 28, 1997. 
 
Vernay sent a new check to Susan Bogen, made out to 
the union, and it was forwarded to Ruocchio. On September 
15, 1997, Ruocchio addressed a letter to Local 60's Vice 
Chairperson Ronald B. Hicks,1 addressing various union 
financial matters, including the check from Vernay. 
Ruocchio noted: 
 
       Finally, over a month ago I had received a refund check 
       from the VERNAY Company for which I returned as a 
       result of it being rejected from the bank as a third 
       party check. I have since received another check from 
       the same company, however the amount is drastically 
       reduced with no explanation. Please advise why this 
       has happened and when I am to expect the additional 
       monies owed to our members. 
 
Copies of the checks issued to Susan Bogen and the union 
show that the amount of both checks was the same-- 
$125. Thus, Ruocchio's representation that the amount of 




1. Copies of the letter were sent to "S. Padelski, L #60" and "B. Walsh, 
Sec. #60." The union Trial Board noted that the letter was read at the 
monthly union meeting on September 28, 1997 during Ruocchio's 
treasurer's report. 
 
                                3 
  
The minutes of the September 28th meeting reflect that 
the inaccuracy of the representation in Ruocchio's letter 
was discussed, and that Ruocchio agreed to print a 
retraction, although no retraction was issued. In a letter 
dated October 14, 1997, General Chairperson Donald 
Bogen charged Ruocchio with a violation of Article 78 of the 
union constitution, which provides: "A member who 
willfully circularizes untrue statements shall be expelled 
from membership in the United Transportation Union if, 
after being charged and tried under the trial provisions of 
this Constitution, his/her guilt has been established." UTU 
Constitution, Art. 78, lines 1-4. Bogen, referencing the 
excerpt from Ruocchio's letter reproduced above, noted: 
 
       "This statement is a lie, both checks were exactly for 
       the same amount. . . . As you know, Susan Bogen my 
       wife, is our office secretary and this is a direct affront 
       to her character as she is the person who the original 
       check was addressed to." At the next monthly union 
       meeting, on October 26, 1997, Ruocchio was removed 
       from office pending trial.2 The trial was originally set 
       for November 21, 1997. 
 
Prior to the original trial date, in addition to appealing 
unsuccessfully to the union's International President for 
relief,3 Ruocchio filed suit in the District Court against the 
UTU, Local 60, and Donald Bogen. Ruocchio alleged that 
Bogen had filed the charge against him in retaliation for his 
political opposition in the November 1996 union elections. 
Ruocchio averred in his complaint that: 
 
       Ruocchio is politically opposed to the Bogan [sic] 
       administration. He campaigned against them in the 
       last election and ran against their hand-picked 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It appears that the formal charge was not forwarded to Ruocchio until 
October 31, 1997. 
 
3. In three letters, two dated November 7, 1997, and one dated November 
11, 1997, Ruocchio asked the International President for a ruling that 
the charge against him violated the LMRDA and the UTU constitution, 
and complained that the Trial Board scheduled to preside at his hearing 
was politically partisan and biased against him. The International 
President refused to intervene while the Trial Board hearing and decision 
were pending. 
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       candidates in the previous elections; further, he has 
       voiced his opposition to the policies of the Bogan 
       administration. 
 
       **** 
 
       Bogan and his political allies are using internal charges 
       to punish their political opponents. 
 
Complaint, PP 10, 13. Additionally, Ruocchio elaborated on 
his allegations in a second affidavit, filed about two months 
after the complaint was filed: 
 
       In the last officer elections conducted by UTU Local 60 
       in November of 1996, I ran on a slate running in 
       opposition to the slate supported by the Local's 
       principal officer, General Chairman Don Bogen, who 
       considers me to be his arch political enemy -- the 
       proverbial camel who got its nose under Bogen's tent. 
 
       **** 
 
       For whatever reasons, Don Bogen reportedly took great 
       umbrage, perhaps because my question concerning the 
       Vernay reimbursement allegedly constituted "a direct 
       affront to [his wife's] character," . . . but more likely 
       because he was hunting for some excuse to remove a 
       "dissident" from his Executive Board otherwise 
       comprised of loyalists or people he can control one way 
       or another. 
 
       In any event, the very first notice I had that my simple, 
       honestly intended question had caused a political 
       aneurysm was when, at the next general membership 
       meeting on October 26, 1997, I was brought up on 
       internal union charges, effectively tried before those 
       members who happened to be in attendance, and 
       removed from the office to which I had been elected by 
       the entire membership. In essence, I was caught totally 
       off balance by Bogen and his lynch mob. I now 
       understand that the event had been carefully scripted 
       for the purpose of eliminating a political opponent. 
 
Second Affidavit of Eugene Ruocchio, PP 2, 8-9 (alteration 
in original). 
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Ruocchio's complaint alleged various violations of Title I 
of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. S 411. Ruocchio claimed that 
defendants violated his right to free speech under 
S 411(a)(2) of the Act,4 and that his suspension from office 
pending trial violated S 411(a)(5), which provides that 
members will be afforded certain procedural safeguards 
before being "fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise 
disciplined."5 D'Angiolillo alleged that Ruocchio's removal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 411(a)(2) provides: 
 
       Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet 
       and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, 
       arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor 
       organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor 
       organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, 
       subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules 
       pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing 
herein 
       shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to 
       adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of 
every 
       member toward the organization as an institution and to his 
       refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance 
of 
       its legal or contractual obligations. 
 
5. We note that Ruocchio's S 411(a)(5) claim is not cognizable, since it 
is 
based on removal from office, not membership. In Sheridan v. United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local No. 626, 306 F.2d 
152 (3d Cir. 1962), this Court held that removal from office did not 
constitute a form of discipline as that term was used in S 529 of Title 
29. 
See id. at 156. Section 529 provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any 
labor organization . . . to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline 
any 
of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the 
provisions of [the LMRDA]." 29 U.S.C. S 529. We reached this conclusion 
because we understood S 529's enumeration offine, suspension, and 
expulsion to "manifest an intention by Congress to protect members qua 
members. Removal from office, on the other hand, is a sanction that can 
be directed only against the limited group of members who happen to be 
officers." Sheridan, 306 F.2d at 156. Thus, we concluded that the 
plaintiff could not state a violation of S 529 based on his removal from 
office. Furthermore, we concluded that S 411 did not protect the 
plaintiff 's status as an officer since the Bill of Rights contained 
therein 
repeatedly refers to the rights of members, not to the rights of officers 
or 
employees. See id. 
 In subsequent cases, we have held that S 411(a)(5) protects the union- 
member relationship, not the union-officer or union-employee 
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from office had deprived D'Angiolillo, who had voted for 
Ruocchio as treasurer, of his right to participate in the 
governance of the local union through a duly elected 
representative and spokesperson in violation ofS 411(a)(1).6 
 
In addition to a request for money damages to 
compensate for loss due to Ruocchio's alleged improper 
removal, and for attorney's fees, plaintiffs also sought 
various forms of injunctive and declaratory relief. Ruocchio 
requested an injunction barring defendants from going 
forward with the trial against him, and reinstating him to 
his position as treasurer. The complaint also requested 1) 
declaratory relief that Article 78 is null and void; and 2) 
injunctive relief not only enjoining defendants from 
enforcing Article 78 and requiring they notify union 
members that Article 78 is no longer in force, but also 
enjoining defendants from retaliating against union 
members for exercising their rights under Title I of the 
LMRDA. 
 
Prior to the union trial, which had been postponed from 
the originally scheduled November date, the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
relationship -- both because of Sheridan's specific holding regarding 
S 411 as a whole and because of the parallel language in S 411(a)(5) and 
S 529. See Martire v. Laborers' Local Union 1058, 410 F.2d 32, 35 (3d 
Cir. 1969) (holding that S 411(a)(5) did not afford a remedy for removal 
from office prior to expiration of term); Harrison v. Local 54 of the Am. 
Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 518 F.2d 1276, 1281 (3d Cir. 
1975) (noting that the LMRDA does not provide relief for removal from 
office or for loss of income resulting therefrom). 
 
6. Only two charges listed in the "Causes of Action" section of the 
complaint refer specifically to D'Angiolillo: theS 411(a)(1) charge, and 
the 
S 411(a)(2) charge that Article 78 "infringes and chills the exercise of 
plaintiffs' free speech rights." The complaint's prayer for relief does 
not 
specify what, if any, relief D'Angiolillo is seeking; in fact, in 
requesting 
relief, it refers to "plaintiff " in the singular. We assume that 
D'Angiolillo 
intended that his claims be remedied by Ruocchio's reinstatement, and 
the other equitable and declaratory relief sought by Ruocchio as 
"plaintiff." We therefore discuss the relief that Ruocchio seeks, and do 
not address separately any relief sought by D'Angiolillo. This does not 
mean that D'Angiolillo could not seek to clarify his position in this 
regard 
on remand to the District Court. 
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heard oral argument on Ruocchio's application for a 
preliminary injunction, but granted defendants' motion to 
dismiss the application, while retaining jurisdiction over the 
matter pending the outcome of the internal union trial. The 
Court explained that it would "not interfere with the 
internal workings of the Union at this point in time." 
Nonetheless, the Court noted: "Though not making a 
determination one way or the other at this time, the Court 
is compelled to note that it has serious reservations as to 
the validity of Article 78." 
 
The union trial was held on March 30, 1998, and, on 
April 10, 1998, the Trial Board ruled that Ruocchio had 
violated Article 78. On May 30, 1998, Ruocchio appealed 
this decision to the International President, who overturned 
the Trial Board and reinstated Ruocchio to his position as 
treasurer, stating: 
 
       I have carefully reviewed the trial transcript, exhibits, 
       and your appeal letter. After such review I have 
       determined that the trial board failed to focus on 
       charges brought and that the record as a whole does 
       not present a violation of any willful circulization of 
       untrue statements as contemplated by Article 78. 
 
On July 13, 1998, in a letter addressed to Bogen (of which 
Ruocchio and other union officials received copies), the 
International President explained that, in overturning the 
Board's decision, he had not judged the propriety of 
Ruocchio's conduct, but had simply concluded that there 




7. The letter provided, in relevant part: 
 
       In considering the appeal, I am duty bound to focus on the precise 
       charge brought, and particularly upon the "willfully" standard 
stated 
       in Article 78 of the Constitution, especially where, as here, the 
free 
       speech rights contained in Title I of the LMRDA limit application 
of 
       Article 78 to narrow circumstances similar to the limitations the 
       First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution places on defamation 
       actions in some circumstances. In short, there was insufficient 
       evidence of record that the clearly erroneous statement in the 
letter 
       that was the focus of the charge made against Mr. Ruocchio had 
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Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for a 
preliminary injunction and a motion for summary judgment 
before the District Court. On July 8, 1998, the District 
Court dismissed the complaint, finding that there was no 
case or controversy due to Ruocchio's reinstatement to his 
position as treasurer. Ruocchio filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which was denied on July 30, 1998. The 
District Court also denied Ruocchio's request for attorney's 
fees by letter order dated September 9, 1998, on the basis 
that Ruocchio was not a prevailing party in the litigation. 
The instant appeal followed. 
 
We base our jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. S 1291, which 
allows us to review final orders of the district courts. The 
District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1331. Our review of the District Court's 
determination that Ruocchio's action was moot is plenary. 
See International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 
912, 914 (3d Cir. 1987).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       been made "willfully" as the courts would apply that term. I have 
no 
       criticism of the action of the Trial Board in hearing this matter 
and 
       making the determination they did. It was just a question of my 
       obligation to construe our Constitution to make sure that its text 
       and application would remain within the difficult boundaries of 
       federal law. 
 
8. The plenary standard of review seems appropriate since mootness 
doctrine relates to courts' constitutional authority to hear a case; a 
court 
must dismiss a case as moot if there is no Article III case or 
controversy. 
However, mootness analysis often encompasses prudential 
considerations, in addition to the threshold constitutional dimension, 
that could be more appropriately reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 
Kelly, 815 F.2d at 915; see also In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 
560 (3d Cir. 1996) (reviewing a mootness determination in the 
bankruptcy context for abuse of discretion, because it involved a 
discretionary balancing of equitable and prudential factors, rather than 
the limits of the federal courts' authority under Article III). In 
practice, 
courts frequently do not parse the two. See Kelly, 815 F.2d at 915. The 
District Court, while not specifically grounding its decision on the 
constitutional aspect of the mootness doctrine, noted that it was 
dismissing the case because "no case or controversy exists." Thus, it 
seems the plenary standard of review is particularly appropriate here, 
where the District Court has appeared to rely solely on constitutional 
grounds. 
 




Although the precise issue before us relates to mootness 
of the instant dispute, and whether plaintiff is entitled to 
relief, the issue is best couched in the following terms for 
our purposes: whether the decision of the dispute 
continues to be justified by sufficient prospect that it will 
have impact on the parties. See 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT 
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 3533, at 212 (1984). 
We conclude that, in light of the unique considerations 
involved in the union speech context, and the facts averred 
in this case, it is likely that a decision in the case 
will impact the parties notwithstanding Ruocchio's 
reinstatement. We will therefore remand to the District 
Court for a determination of the claims that should be 
decided, in light of this opinion. 
 
As indicated above, plaintiff sought several types of relief: 
money damages; attorney's fees; a declaration that Article 
78 is null and void; and injunctive relief, enjoining 
defendants from enforcing Article 78, requiring defendants 
to provide notice to union members that Article 78 is 
unenforceable, and prohibiting defendants from retaliating 
against union members in violation of their rights under 
Title I of the LMRDA.9 The District Court held that the 
reinstatement rendered the entire case moot. However, a 
case may be moot as to one remedy, but not as to others. 
 
Here there can be no question that Ruocchio's claim for 
monetary damages survives and is not moot. See Sheet 
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 354-55 
(1989) (holding that an officer had stated a cause of action 
under S 411(a)(2) because retaliatory removal from office 
constituted a price paid for the exercise of his membership 
right of free speech). The District Court never addressed 
this claim, but we hold that on this basis alone the District 
Court must hear the case to determine Ruocchio's 
entitlement to damages. The question as to whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Plaintiffs also requested injunctive relief prohibiting the union trial 
from going forward, and reinstating Ruocchio to his position as 
treasurer. These claims for relief are clearly moot, in light of the fact 
that 
the union trial has already taken place, and that Ruocchio has already 
been reinstated. 
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plaintiff continues to have a claim for declaratory and 
injunctive relief is a closer one. However, based on the 
allegations of plaintiff's complaint and his affidavit in this 
case, we have little difficulty in finding that these claims, 
too, are very much alive, and have not been rendered moot 
by Ruocchio's reinstatement. Ruocchio's complaint paints a 
picture of the union employing a provision of its 
constitution to silence speech in opposition to the union 
leadership. The entire check incident is averred to have 
been employed as a device to punish Ruocchio for his vocal 
support of others. Whether or not the union's International 
President ultimately reinstated Ruocchio to his office, his 
complaint is based on retaliation for speech protected by 
the LMRDA, and we view our decisions in Mallick v. 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 644 F.2d 
228 (3d Cir. 1981) and Semancik v. United Mine Workers of 
America District # 5, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972) as 
requiring that his claim for declaratory and injunctive relief 
be heard. We will also remand the decision regarding 





This appeal presents a situation in which First 
Amendment principles intersect with concerns particular to 
union speech issues in a way that has, historically, caused 
Congress and the federal courts to proceed with special 
care. Congress's commitment to providing special 
protection for free speech rights in the union context is 
illustrated by Title I of the LMRDA, commonly referred to as 
the LMRDA's "Bill of Rights." The courts have played a 
significant role in defining the contours of the LMRDA's 
speech provisions, and have "shaped the Bill of Rights into 
a guarantee of union democracy, with the right of free 
speech enjoying a particularly favored position." Fulton 
Lodge No. 2 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 1969). In 
construing its terms, the Supreme Court has considered 
that the predecessor to the LMRDA's current Bill of Rights 
was adopted as an amendment on the Senate floor by 
legislators who "feared that the bill did not go far enough 
 
                                11 
  
because it did not provide general protection to union 
members who spoke out against the union leadership." 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 109 
(1982); see also Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 
488 U.S. 347, 352 (1989). The Court concluded that the 
legislative history revealed that Title I of the LMRDA was 
modeled after the Constitution's Bill of Rights, and was 
intended "to restate a principal First Amendment value -- 
the right to speak one's mind without fear of reprisal." 
Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 111 (finding, however, that the 
scope of S 411(a)(2) of the LMRDA is not identical to the 
scope of the First Amendment). 
 
Violations of rights guaranteed by the LMRDA are of 
particular concern because discipline of one union member 
based on such a violation may deter other members from 
exercising their rights, thereby threatening the rights of all 
union members. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973). In 
Hall, the Court determined that courts had authority to 
award attorney's fees to successful LMRDA plaintiffs, 
observing that, "by vindicating his own right, the successful 
litigant dispels the `chill' cast upon the rights of others." Id. 
at 8-9, 14. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in 
Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963): 
 
       The LMRDA of 1959 was designed to protect the rights 
       of union members to discuss freely and criticize the 
       management of their unions and the conduct of their 
       officers. The legislative history and the extensive 
       hearings which preceded the enactment of the statute 
       abundantly evidence the intention of the Congress to 
       prevent union officials from using their disciplinary 
       powers to silence criticism and punish those who dare 
       to question and complain. 
 
Id. at 448-49. Salzhandler held that the protection afforded 
by the LMRDA was so broad that even libelous speech was 
protected. See id. at 450-51 (holding that libelous speech 
that may be the basis for a civil action may not be the basis 
for union discipline, because union "procedure is peculiarly 
unsuited for drawing the fine line between criticism and 
defamation"); see also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 
(1974) (finding, in the First Amendment context, that states 
may not impose liability for false and defamatory speech 
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absent a showing of fault).10 Courts have also held that the 
LMRDA provides them with broad discretion to fashion 
appropriate relief for LMRDA violations. See Gartner v. 
Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 354-56 (3d Cir. 1967) (discussing 
courts' broad remedial power under the LMRDA, in 
determining that attorney's fees may be awarded under the 
statute). 
 
Further, in light of the above concerns, courts have been 
expansive in their view of a litigant's standing to bring legal 
action in situations in which free speech rights are 
implicated. Cases addressing issues of standing in the free 
speech labor context -- which mirror the same concerns 
that exist regarding mootness -- have recognized that 
limitations on free speech rights can result in a"chilling 
effect" on others' exercise of those rights, and have taken a 
broad view of standing based on this prospect.11 In Nelson 
v. International Association of Bridge, Structural & 
Ornamental Iron Workers, 680 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1988), 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The dissent cites Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966), for the proposition that libelous 
statements of union members are not protected from union action. 
Although there is language in Linn suggesting that unions should adopt 
procedures proscribing libelous speech, Linn ultimately dealt with a civil 
action against libelous speech, not union action against libelous speech. 
See id. at 55. As noted above, Salzhandler  distinguished between the 
two, finding that speech that may be the basis of a civil action might not 
be an appropriate basis for union action. See Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 
450-51. Thus, Linn is not inconsistent with Salzhandler's conclusion that 
unions may not proscribe libelous speech. 
 
11. Cases addressing standing are relevant to our inquiry because the 
question of standing "bears close affinity" to the question of mootness. 
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975). Both standing and 
mootness involve the consideration of whether an Article III case or 
controversy exists. See id. at 498; Kelly, 815 F.2d at 914. In dismissing 
the instant case, the District Court equated mootness with the absence 
of a case or controversy. Mootness has been described as representing "a 
time dimension of standing, requiring that the interests originally 
sufficient to confer standing persist throughout the suit." WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra, S 3533.1, at 220. We adopted a similar view in Artway v. Attorney 
General, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996), in which we explained that 
mootness "asks whether a party who has established standing has now 
lost it because the facts of her case have changed over time." Id. at 
1246. 
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the court looked to the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine in determining if plaintiffs had standing to 
challenge a union provision as violative of the LMRDA. See 
id. at 24. One of the plaintiffs had not even been charged 
under the provision, and simply alleged that his own 
interpretation of the broad provision induced him to remain 
silent. See id. at 23. Nonetheless, the court explained that, 
under the relaxed rules of standing applied in this context: 
 
       Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a 
       statute not because their own rights of free expression 
       are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or 
       assumption that the statute's very existence may cause 
       others not before the Court to refrain from 
       constitutionally protected speech or expression. 
 
Id. at 24 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 
612 (1973)). The court concluded that the plaintiffs had 
standing to challenge the section of the union constitution, 
because it was so "grossly overbroad," and"so plainly" 
violated the LMRDA that " `no judicial prediction or 
assumption' is necessary to ascertain that free speech will 
be chilled," and denying plaintiffs standing would 
perpetuate the chilling effect on the rights of all union 
members. Id. at 25; see also Virginia v. American 
Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) (plaintiffs had 
standing to raise a facial challenge to an allegedly speech- 
infringing statute before the statute had been enforced 
because they had alleged "an actual and well-founded fear" 
that the statute would be enforced against them, and"the 
alleged danger of this statute is, in large measure, one of 
self-censorship; a harm that can be realized even without 
an actual prosecution").12 
 
We have had occasion to endorse this expansive view of 
union speech rights, in Mallick v. International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers, 644 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1981) and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The dissent characterizes plaintiff 's claim arising from the 
application of Article 78 to him as an "abstract" injury, rather than one 
that is "distinct" and "palpable." We submit, however, that in the context 
of union speech, a claim that rights have been chilled has been deemed 
anything but abstract. See Mallick v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 
644 F.2d at 235. 
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Semancik v. United Mine Workers of America District # 5, 
466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972). In Mallick, plaintiff union 
members were "vocal and persistent critics" of union 
leadership who were charged with violating various 
provisions of the union constitution, including provisions 
similar to the one at issue in this case. See Mallick, 644 
F.2d at 230-32. The provisions made punishable: 
"[p]ublishing or circulating among the membership, or 
among [local unions] false reports or misrepresentations," 
and "[s]landering or otherwise wronging a member of the 
[union] by any willful act or acts." Id. at 231 n.1. The 
penalties assessed for violations of these particular 
provisions were eventually reversed by the union's 
international representative, due to insufficient evidence 
that the statements at issue were untrue, much like the 
charges were reversed in the instant case. See id. at 232 & 
n.5. In addition to compensatory and punitive damages, 
plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring 
enforcement of the allegedly illegal union provisions under 
which they had been charged. See id. at 232. The district 
court determined that plaintiff union members lacked 
standing to challenge the validity of union provisions that 
formed the basis for charges that had been overturned by 
the international representative. See id. at 233. We 
reversed. See id. at 236. 
 
In holding that the district court erred in failing to 
consider plaintiffs' equitable claims based on these charges, 
we noted the "expansive protection" given to union 
members' speech rights. See id. at 235 ("The Bill of Rights 
section of the [LMRDA] is designed to foster democratic 
governance within labor unions, and to encourage members 
freely to dissent from the policies and administration of the 
leadership or to discuss openly those policies and 
practices."). Had the district court properly considered the 
broad protections afforded to speech under the LMRDA, 
and the unique nature of speech infringements, it would 
not have concluded that, because the charges were 
overturned on appeal, plaintiffs necessarily did not suffer 
an actionable injury. See id. 
 
       Harm to free speech rights . . . is not measured solely 
       in economic terms, nor must concrete punishment be 
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       meted out to confer standing to sue. The right to speak 
       one's views freely is so fundamental that the spectre of 
       punishment, or the uncertainty created by a vaguely 
       worded prohibition of speech, is injurious as well. 
 
Id. We noted that the mere fact that the members were 
charged, as well as the possibility of future charges based 
on the challenged prohibitions, could have a substantial 
chilling effect on plaintiffs' and other union members' 
exercise of their free speech rights: "The goal of union 
democracy, achieved through the expression of opposing 
viewpoints, would be difficult to realize if members felt 
deterred from expressing their opinions by the prospect of 
disciplinary proceedings." Id. at 236. Accordingly, we 
remanded for the district court to consider whether the 
provisions at issue violated S 411 of the LMRDA. See id.13 
 
In Semancik, we recognized the district courts' broad 
discretion to fashion remedies for speech violations in the 
union context, and determined that the district court 
properly entered a permanent injunction prohibiting 
enforcement of a union provision that violated the LMRDA, 
because the union provision was broad and ill-defined, and 
had been repeatedly utilized to stifle protected speech. See 
Semancik, 466 F.2d at 152-53, 156. In so doing, we 
rejected the defendants' argument that the district court 
was limited to granting individual injunctions on a case-by- 
case basis to union members who could show that their 
speech rights had been violated. We concluded that under 
S 412 of the LMRDA the district court's power to grant relief 
was not so circumscribed, and that S 412 afforded district 
courts the discretion to fashion whatever relief was 
appropriate to protect union members' rights, including 
injunctions. See id. at 155-56. We specifically stated that 
courts' "discretionary power is to be broadly construed to 
effectuate the purposes of the statute." Id. at 156. This 
provision, coupled with S 411(b) of the LMRDA, which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. While our dissenting colleague seeks to distinguish Mallick based on 
the actual injury in that case, our focus in Mallick was not on the extent 
of union reprisal but, rather, on the harm visited in non-economic terms 
via the chill on, and deterrence of, the right of expression. See Mallick, 
644 F.2d at 235-36. 
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provides that union provisions in violation of the LMRDA 
shall be "of no force or effect," empowered the district court 
to enjoin permanently a union provision violative of the 
LMRDA. See id. at 155-56. Once again, we took into 
account the important consideration that union power is 
subject to restrictions in the face of the members' 
competing freedom of speech claim. See id. at 153 
("[C]ourts have responded by making clear that labor 
organizations properly exercise their disciplinary powers 
only over a limited area of proscribed conduct inimical to 
the union as an entity and collective bargaining 
mechanism. Unless statements fall into these categories, 
they are protected from union action even if libelous."). 
 
Both Mallick and Semancik illustrate the broad protection 
the LMRDA affords speech rights in the union context, and 
demonstrate that we may view the harm caused by 
regulation of such speech somewhat differently from the 
harm or injury occurring in other contexts. Both cases also 
reflect the wide discretion granted to district courts so that 
they may fashion remedies that satisfy these concerns. 
These factors are present in the instant case, and lead us 
to the same conclusion that we reached in Mallick -- that 
the District Court should have considered whether 
equitable and declaratory relief was appropriate. Ruocchio's 
reinstatement and the reversal of the charges against him 
no more automatically foreclose his rights to additional 
relief than the reversal of the charges did in Mallick; the 
remedies sought by Ruocchio of an injunction against 
enforcement of the constitutional provision, and declaration 
of its invalidity, may indeed retain sufficient utility to justify 
their implementation. In both of these cases, we reiterated 
in broad and expansive terms the need for the courts to 
entertain, and enjoin, union exercise of power that chills 
speech protected by the LMRDA. To conclude, as the 
dissent does, that these important rulings do not support 
our conclusion is to turn our jurisprudence on its head. 
 
Our dissenting colleague urges that our ruling opens the 
flood gates to union members' protests against valid union 
regulation based upon the "sole" "bald" allegation that their 
speech has been "chilled." Rather than take issue with this 
view, we embrace this characterization as a fair statement 
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of what the law requires. Our jurisprudence compels us to 
give a union member the opportunity to protect his right to 
speak his views as legislatively mandated by S 411(a)(2) of 
the LMRDA. In so doing we suggest that the harm it seeks 
to avoid is very real, and the power it seeks to curtail can 
be wielded in ways not apparent on the face of a union 
constitution. See Mallick, 644 F.2d at 235; Semancik, 466 
F.2d at 152. 
 
We do not decide whether Ruocchio is entitled to 
declaratory and injunctive relief; we hold only that the 
claims do have vitality before the District Court. We note 
that by determining that these claims for relief are not 
moot, we have addressed the simplest part of the equation. 
Determining whether the conduct of the union actors, 
and/or the challenged constitutional provision itself, violate 
S 411(a)(2) of the LMRDA and, if so, what relief should be 
provided, are far more complicated inquiries. As this case 
was dismissed without the aid of any discovery, we cannot 
begin to address these issues and must entrust them to the 
District Court for resolution on remand. 
 
We will also vacate the District Court's ruling denying 
plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees. To recover attorney's 
fees under the LMRDA, a claimant must be a prevailing 
party and his lawsuit must provide a common benefit to all 
union members. See Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972, 
980 (3d Cir. 1983). The District Court found that Ruocchio 
could not recover attorney's fees because he did not 
technically prevail in the case before it. We view this 
decision as reflecting an inadequate inquiry into the factors 
set forth in Pawlak. On remand, the District Court will 
necessarily revisit its ruling based on the outcome of the 
monetary, equitable, and declaratory claims for relief it will 
now hear as discussed above, and in doing so, should 
reconsider the Pawlak factors. We note that, for purposes 
of Pawlak's "prevailing party" requirement, Ruocchio need 
not obtain ultimate success in the form of a judgment in 
order to be entitled to attorney's fees. See Baumgartner v. 
Harrisburg Housing Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 544 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Brennan v. United Steelworkers of Am., 554 F.2d 586, 591 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1977). Rather, if plaintiffs have been a 
"catalyst," so that defendants voluntarily ceased the 
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behavior challenged by plaintiffs, plaintiffs can still be 
"prevailing parties" if they prove that the lawsuit was a 
material contributing factor in bringing about the desired 
relief. See Baumgartner, 21 F.3d at 544-45 (citing Wheeler 
v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 
1991)); see also Riley v. McCarthy, 723 F. Supp. 1521, 
1522 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding that an LMRDA plaintiff is a 
"prevailing party" even absent judgment on the merits as 
long as the lawsuit was not frivolous, the plaintiff 
substantially obtained the relief sought, and the lawsuit 
was an important factor in obtaining that relief). Further, 
plaintiffs may satisfy Pawlak's common benefit requirement 
if, by vindicating their rights under the LMRDA, they have 
"dispelled the `chill' cast upon the rights of all Union 
members and contributed to the preservation of union 




For all of the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
District Court's determination that plaintiffs' lawsuit was 
moot, vacate the District Court's denial of attorney's fees, 
and remand to the District Court for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently made clear that lies 
and willful defamation are not shielded by the expansive 
reach of the First Amendment. Yet, the majority suggests 
that a provision of a union constitution, which prohibits 
this same type of defamation, creates a chilling effect on 
speech sufficient to create a justiciable controversy in a 
case pursuant to the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"). This conclusion is unacceptable 
to me. I dissent. 
 
This appeal requires us to decide whether the district 
court erred by dismissing Appellants' claims as moot after 
Eugene Ruocchio was reinstated to the office of treasurer of 
United Transportation Local #60 on June 10, 1998. 
Ruocchio was first suspended from that office on October 
27, 1997, pending a trial board hearing on a charge that he 
violated Article 78 of the Union Constitution, and was 
removed from office on April 10, 1998 after the board found 
him guilty. Article 78 provides: 
 
       A member who willfully circularizes untrue statements 
       shall be expelled from membership in the United 
       Transportation Union if, after being charged and tried 
       under the trial provisions of this Constitution, his/her 
       guilt has been established. 
 
App. at 39. Notwithstanding the mootness issue, critical to 
our ultimate decision is whether the mere accusation that 
a union member has violated Article 78, without proof that 
the member has been damaged by the accusation, is such 
an injury as to make out a justiciable case or controversy 
as a violation of the LMRDA, specifically 29 U.S.C. 
S 411(a)(2). The majority believes that an accusation is 
sufficient. I am unable to agree because, in my view, 
Appellants no longer have a case or controversy vesting the 
district court with jurisdiction. Accordingly, for reasons 
related to those expressed by the district court but with a 
somewhat different emphasis on the doctrine of 
justiciability, I would affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
 




Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power 
by extending it only to cases and controversies." `All of the 
doctrines that cluster about Article III--not only standing 
but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like-- 
relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to 
an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a 
rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and 
prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, 
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.' " 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander 
Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-1179 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(Bork, J., concurring)). 
 
As early as 1937, the Court made clear that a genuine 
case or controversy is necessary for the federal courts to 
grant relief to litigants. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. 
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-240 (1937) (interpreting the 
Declaratory Judgment Act). The court enunciated precepts 
that define "case or controversy": 
 
       A "controversy" in this sense must be one that is 
       appropriate for judicial determination. A justiciable 
       controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or 
       dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from 
       one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be 
       definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of 
       parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real 
       and substantive controversy admitting of specific relief 
       through a decree of conclusive character, as 
       distinguished from an opinion advising what a law 
       would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 
 
Id. at 240-241 (citations omitted). 
 
Thus, Article III requires a party seeking relief to allege 
personal injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant's 
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the 
requested relief. See Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The injury alleged must be 
distinct and palpable, Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979), and not "abstract" or 
"conjectural" or "hypothetical," City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 
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461 U.S. 95, 101-102 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 
488, 494 (1974). In the absence of such an injury, the 
requirements of Article III are not satisfied and the district 





As a threshold consideration, Appellants cannot breathe 
justiciability into their law suit by claiming economic injury 
from Ruocchio's suspension, removal and subsequent 
reinstatement as treasurer of the local union. The 
complaint's allegations relating to monetary damages are 
grounded on Ruocchio's suspension as an officer of the 
union, not as a member. We have held that "the LMRDA 
does not provide relief to a union officer for suspension as 
an officer, nor for loss of income resulting therefrom." 
Harrison v. Local 54 of Amer. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. 
Employees, AFL-CIO, 518 F.2d 1276, 1281 (3d Cir. 1975). 
See also Martire v. Laborers' Local Union 1058, 410 F.2d 
32, 35 (3d Cir. 1969) ("In Sheridan v. United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters, 306 F.2d 152 ([3d Cir.] 1962) we held that . . . 
Title I of the LMRDA . . . [does not] afford[ ] a remedy to a 
business agent of a union who has been removed from his 
elected office prior to the expiration of his term, for the 
reason that `[i]t is the union-member relationship, not the 





The majority believes that an amorphous "chilling effect" 
of Article 78 on Appellants' speech is sufficient to confer 
standing such that a justiciable controversy exists and in 
so doing, makes an assumption that standing in a First 
Amendment case is co-extensive with standing in a 
S 411(a)(2) claim. Although courts have looked to First 
Amendment cases for guidance in S 411(a)(2) cases, it is 
clear that the two are not co-extensive. United Steelworkers 
of America v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982) 
("However, there is absolutely no indication that Congress 
intended the scope of S 101(a)(2) to be identical to the scope 
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of the First Amendment. Rather, Congress' decision to 
include a proviso covering `reasonable' rules refutes that 
proposition."). Because the First Amendment provides 
broader protection of speech rights, there is no reason to 
assume that standing requirements in S 411(a)(2) cases are 
equivalent to those required to seek First Amendment relief. 
Indeed, ruling case law indicates that the exact reverse is 
true. 
 
Notwithstanding the slightly broader concepts of standing 
in a First Amendment context, there are clear limits to what 
non-economic injury is sufficient to confer standing in a 
complaint brought under S 411(a)(2). Section 411(a)(2) itself 
provides one such limit: 
 
       Every member of any labor organization shall have the 
       right to meet and assemble freely with other members; 
       and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and 
       to express at meetings of the labor organization his 
       views, upon candidates in an election of the labor 
       organization or upon any business properly before the 
       meeting, subject to the organization's established and 
       reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: 
       Provided That nothing herein shall be construed to 
       impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and 
       enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every 
       member toward the organization as an institution and 
       to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with 
       its performance of its legal or contractual obligations. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 411(a)(2) (emphasis added). The legislative 
history indicates that the provision that 
 
       preserves the union's right to adopt reasonable rules 
       governing the responsibilities of its members . . . was 
       designed to remove "the extremes raised by the 
       [freedom of speech and assembly provisions]" . . . and 
       to assure that the amendment would not "unduly 
       harass and obstruct legitimate unionism." 
 
United Steelworkers of America, 457 U.S. at 110 (quoting 
105 Cong. Rec. 6721, 6722 (1959) (statements of Sen. 
Cooper and Sen. Church)). Thus, we must determine 
whether Article 78 qualifies as one of the permitted 
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"reasonable rules" under S 411(a)(2). If it is a reasonable 




"Congress adopted the freedom of speech and assembly 
provision [of the LMRDA] in order to promote union 
democracy." Id. at 112. To understand the breadth of union 
democracy, we must ascertain the limitations to speech in 
the broader community in which we live, under a political 
democracy. Because the First Amendment provides greater 
protection for speech, any limitation of its protection 
applies a fortiori to the protections ofS 411(a)(2). 
 
Even under the broader limitations of the First 
Amendment, our speech is restricted by the law of 
defamation and the criminal statutes that proscribe or 
punish lying under oath. The law of defamation, for 
example, imposes liability for any statement that"asserts or 
implies a statement of fact which is damaging to 
reputation." Sedore v. Recorder Publishing Co., 716 A.2d 
1196, 1200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); see also Sisler 
v. Gannett Co., Inc., 516 A.2d 1083, 1086-1088 (N.J. 1986) 
(discussing cases that "attempt to pacify the warring 
interests of free speech and individual reputation"). 
Numerous state and federal laws prohibit the making of 
false statements under oath, "under penalty" or to law 
enforcement officers. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. S 1621 (perjury); 
18 U.S.C. S 1623 (false declarations before grand jury or 
court); N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:28-1 (perjury); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 2C:28-2 (false swearing); N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:28-3 
(unsworn falsification to authorities); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 2C:28-4 (false reports to law enforcement authorities). 
 
Whatever have been the recent efforts in some quarters to 
denigrate the importance of telling the truth, society still 
places a premium on truth-telling and a penalty for 
violating the precepts prohibiting lying under oath. Even 
the President of the United States is not immune from such 
penalties. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp.2d 1118, 1130, 
1131 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (adjudging the President to be in civil 
contempt because his "deposition testimony regarding 
whether he had ever been alone with Ms. Lewinsky was 
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intentionally false, and his statements regarding whether 
he had ever engaged in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky 
likewise were intentionally false, notwithstanding tortured 
definitions and interpretations of the term `sexual 
relations.' "). 
 
Deliberately telling a lie or circularizing an untruth in the 
general community is neither protected nor acceptable in 
our society: 
 
       [T]he use of the known lie as a [political] tool is at once 
       at odds with the premises of democratic government 
       and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, 
       or political change is to be effected. . . . [T]he knowingly 
       false statement and the false statement made with 
       reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy 
       constitutional protection. 
 
Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). Even 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and 
its progeny in actions against public officials, the First 
Amendment does not shield the publication of defamatory 
falsehood made " `with actual malice'--that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 




In the context of Article 78, "willfully," in the sense of 
intentionally or knowingly, is equivalent to the"actual 
malice" definition in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 
Because the First Amendment does not insulate a public 
official from making a statement with knowledge that it is 
false, there can be no doubt that S 411(a)(2) does not 
protect a union member from the consequences of his own 
willful circularization of untrue statements. Thus, a union 
rule restricting this practice cannot be considered 
unreasonable. Cf. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of 
America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 55 (1966) (determining 
that, in the context of national labor policy, a district court 
has jurisdiction to entertain a civil action for libel instituted 
under state law by a party to a labor dispute). 
 
The fundamental purpose of labor unions also supports 
the reasonableness of Article 78. Implicit in all phases of 
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labor organizations is the hallowed workers' proclamation 
"In union there is strength." The keystone of our national 
labor policy was articulated in the National Labor Relations 
Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, S 1, 49 Stat. 449 (the "Wagner 
Labor Act"), and repeated verbatim in the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. S 141 et seq.: 
 
       It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United 
       States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial 
       obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to 
       mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they 
       have occurred by encouraging the practice and 
       procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the 
       exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self 
       organization, and designation of representatives of their 
       own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms 
       and conditions of their employment or other mutual 
       aid or protection.14 
 
29 U.S.C. S 151. The Wagner Labor Act also stated: 
 
       The inequality of bargaining power between employees 
       who do not possess full freedom of association or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. National labor policy was first announced in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1933: 
 
       Sec.7. (a) Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license 
       approved, prescribed, or issued under this title shall contain the 
       following conditions:  (1) That employees shall have the right to 
       organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their 
       own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, 
or 
       coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation 
of 
       such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted 
       activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid 
       or protection; (2) that no employee and no one seeking employment 
       shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company 
       union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor 
       organization of his own choosing; and (3) that employers shall 
       comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, 
       and other conditions of employment, approved or prescribed by the 
       President. 
 
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90,S 7(a), 48 Stat.195, 198 
(1933) (held invalid by A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 
U.S. 495 (1935)). 
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       actual liberty of contract, and employers who are 
       organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership 
       association substantially burdens and affects theflow 
       of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent 
       business depressions, by depressing wage rates and 
       the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and 
       by preventing the stabilization of competitive wages 
       rates and working conditions within and between 
       industries. 
 
Ch. 372, S 1, 49 Stat. 449. Finally, the Labor Management 
Relations Act states: 
 
       Experience has proved that protection by law of the 
       right of employees to organize and bargain collectively 
       . . . restor[es] equality of bargaining power between 
       employers and employees. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 151. Thus, we must recognize that the 
fundamental purpose of the United Transportation Union 
Local #60 was to permit members to organize and bargain 
collectively for terms and conditions of employment in order 
to offset the economic, social and political power of 
employers. 
 
In sensitive collective bargaining with employers and in 
processing grievances, the unified front of the union is of 
paramount importance. It is therefore a desirable objective 
to promote harmony and minimize acrimony within the 
ranks. A union is not an academic debating society; it is a 
formal democratic association of fellow workers founded to 
implement the "practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining." 29 U.S.C. S 151; Wagner Labor Act, ch. 372, 
S 1, 47 Stat. 449. 
 
The prohibition of the commission of deliberate 
falsehoods by one union member against another helps to 
insure maximum harmony and thus to produce unity 
within the union. It serves the salutary purpose of 
minimizing dissension, disharmony and internal conflict 
within a labor organization whose effectiveness in 
bargaining collectively or processing grievances is 
calculated on unity of action. Article 78, exactly this type of 
prohibition, therefore implements the aims and objectives of 
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labor unions as protected by precepts of a national labor 
policy in force for well over half a century. 
 
To suggest as do the Appellants that Article 78 is illegal 
on its face is a concept that flouts the basic precepts of 
organized labor and free speech rights. To encourage willful 
circulation of untrue statements within a union is to 
generate dissension and disharmony within the union's 
rank and file, weaken the union's effectiveness and play 
into the hands of those segments of society that have 
steadfastly opposed and battled the legitimacy of organized 
labor and collective bargaining, all of which have been 
hallmarks of our national labor policy at least since 1933 
and 1935. 
 
Accordingly, I would hold as a matter of law that Article 
78 is one of the "reasonable rules" that a union may adopt 
in accordance with S 411(a) (2). Thus, in my view, any 
nebulous, so-called chilling effect of Article 78 is 




The majority determines that certain precedents of this 
court dictate that Appellants' case is still alive because 
Appellants asserted declaratory and equitable claims in 
addition to their claims for monetary relief. See Maj. Op. at 
11 ("[W]e view our decisions in Mallick v. International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 644 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 
1981) and Semancik v. United Mine Workers of America 
District # 5, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972) as requiring that 
his claim for declaratory and injunctive relief be heard."). 
An examination of these cases indicates that they 
constitute no meaningful authority for the majority's 




In Mallick, we determined that "[h]arm to free speech 
rights . . . is not measured solely in economic terms, nor 
must concrete punishment be meted out to confer standing 
to sue." 644 F.2d at 235. We then explained:"The right to 
speak one's views is so fundamental that the spectre of 
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punishment, or the uncertainty created by a vaguely 
worded prohibition of speech, is injurious as well." Id. 
 
In discussing Mallick, the majority states: 
 
       We noted that the mere fact that the members were 
       charged, as well as the possibility of future charges 
       based on the challenged prohibitions, could have a 
       substantial chilling effect on plaintiffs' and other union 
       members' exercise of their free speech rights: "The goal 
       of union democracy, achieved through the expression 
       of opposing viewpoints, would be difficult to realize if 
       members felt deterred from expressing their opinions 
       by the prospect of disciplinary proceedings."[Mallick, 
       644 F.2d] at 236. Accordingly, we remanded for the 
       district court to consider whether the provisions at 
       issue violated S 411 of the LMRDA. Id. 
 
Maj. Op. at 16. This intimates that the only injury suffered 
by the Mallick plaintiff union members was the chilling of 
their free speech rights. In fact, in Mallick , there was 
substantial economic injury averred as well as "the spectre 
of punishment" for engaging in protected activity. For 
example, the Mallick plaintiffs alleged harassment for 
talking to newsmen and communicating with the National 
Labor Relations Board, Congressmen and Labor 
Department officials. They also claimed retaliation by the 
union in the form of less desirable job assignments. We 
stated that "[t]hese claims of emotional distress and 
economic injury were deemed sufficient to support damage 
awards by the jury, and they confer standing to challenge 
the validity of a union constitution which was invoked to 
punish them for protected conduct." Mallick, 644 F.2d at 
236. 
 
Here, by contrast, there are no allegations of economic 
injury qua membership in the union. The allegations of 
injury are insufficient to satisfy even the lenient 
requirements of standing for a S 411(a)(2) claim. There was 
only one charge brought against Ruocchio and, as detailed 
in great length above, see supra Part III, it was for 
unprotected speech. See Linn, 383 U.S. at 63 ("[T]he most 
repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of 
a deliberate or reckless untruth.") (emphasis added); 
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Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 ("[T]he knowingly false statement 
and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the 
truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection."); New York 
Times, 376 U.S. at 279-280 (holding that the First 
Amendment does not shield the publication of defamatory 
falsehood made with actual malice). Ruocchio's temporary 
removal from office, and any economic loss he suffered as 
an officer is not an injury that may be recouped under the 
LMRDA and thus is also insufficient to confer standing. 
Harrison, 518 F.2d at 1281. The only remaining allegation 
of injury is Appellants' assertion that their speech has been 
"chilled." To consider this bald allegation sufficient to confer 
standing under the LMRDA is to eviscerate the entire 
concept of standing in the free speech context. 
 
The majority believes that the material facts of this case 
and those of Mallick are identical or substantially similar. 
This suggestion does not reflect the complete material or 
adjudicative facts in that case. As stated above, the Mallick 
plaintiffs were charged for clearly protected activity and 
received less desirable job assignments. 
 
       A judicial precedent attaches a specific legal 
       consequence to a detailed set of facts in an adjudged 
       case or judicial decision, which is then considered as 
       furnishing the rule for the determination of a 
       subsequent case involving identical or similar material 
       facts and arising in the same court or a lower court in 
       the judicial hierarchy. 
 
Allegheny General Hospital v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 608 
F.2d 965, 969-970 (3d Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted and 
emphasis added). Mallick does not qualify as a legal 
precedent for this case because the basic differences in 
material or adjudicative facts outweigh the resemblances to 




Nor may Appellants find support in the teachings of 
Semancik. At issue in Semancik was Article X, Section 10 of 
the United Mine Workers constitution, which provided in 
part: 
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       [A]ny member or members resorting to dishonest or 
       questionable practices to secure the election or defeat of 
       any candidate for district office shall be tried by the 
       district executive board and fined, suspended or 
       expelled as the magnitude of the transgression may 
       warrant. 
 
See Semancik, 466 F.2d at 147 (emphasis added). We held 
that Section 10 "presents a threat and obstacle to free 
speech because it is so vague and ill-defined that whenever 
a union member might exercise the right guaranteed to him 
under the LMRDA, he is in peril of violating the provision. 
In response to such a union rule, a reasonable man might 
well refrain from taking full advantage of his rights." Id. at 
153-154. 
 
I am unwilling to equate the "vague and ill-defined" 
Section 10 with the clear and unambiguous terms of Article 
78, which prescribes penalties for any member who 
"willfully circularizes untrue statements." The average 
union member would certainly understand what is meant 
by "untrue statements" or "circularizes." This is a far cry 
from the obtuse expressions in Semancik:"dishonest or 
questionable practices." Nor can we fault the use of the 
word "willfully," in the sense that this means intentionally 
or knowingly as distinguished from accidentally or 
negligently. Were we to hold otherwise, hundreds of federal 
criminal statutes in Title 18 of the United States Code 
would suffer the same lethal fate. I therefore have no 
difficulty in distinguishing Article 78 in this union's 
constitution from the condemned Article X, Section 10 in 
the United Mine Workers constitution in Semancik. 
 
Nor does the following portion of the Semancik opinion, 
relied upon by the majority, give effective support to its 
theory: 
 
       [C]ourts have responded by making clear that labor 
       organizations properly exercise their disciplinary 
       powers only over a limited area of proscribed conduct 
       inimical to the union as an entity and the collective 
       bargaining mechanism. Unless statements fall into 
       these categories, they are protected from union action 
       even if libelous. 
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Id. at 153, quoted in Maj. Op. at 17. Consistent with 
Semancik, Article 78 does prohibit "conduct inimical to the 
union as an entity and the collective bargaining 
mechanism." As stated in detail above, see supra Part III, 
the mantra of organized labor is "In union, there is 
strength." By proscribing the willful circularizing of untrue 
statements, Article 78 serves that purpose by minimizing 
acrimony and promoting harmony within the ranks. 
 
Moreover, notwithstanding the quoted language of 
Semancik, the reference that statements of union members 
are protected from union action "even if libelous" is simply 
not a correct statement of ruling Supreme Court case law. 
This proposition flies in the face of the unambiguous 
holding of the Court in Linn: 
 
       [T]he most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided 
       it falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth. But it 
       must be emphasized that malicious libel enjoys no 
       constitutional protection in any context. After all, the 
       labor movement has grown up and must assume 
       ordinary responsibilities. The malicious utterance of 
       defamatory statements in any form cannot be condoned, 
       and unions should adopt procedures calculated to 
       prevent such abuses. 
 
383 U.S. at 63 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the 
teachings of Semancik do not support the existence of a 




Therefore, the two major cases that form the linchpin of 
the majority's opinion do not support their conclusions. 
Moreover, acceptance of the notion that any union member 
who is charged with violating Article 78--without proof of 
actual financial injury or of the deprivation of the right to 
vote, to discuss union matters or to hold office--may bring 
an action in federal court to challenge the legality of the 
Article will generate a state of labor union disruption that 
will hail unions, their members and their officers into 
federal court every time any disciplinary rule of a union is 
invoked by a member, officer or committee against another, 
under the guise that merely initiating an internal union 
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proceeding, in and of itself, violates a member's"right to 
meet and assemble freely." This certainly does not promote 
union democracy, nor does it promote unity and harmony 
within the rank and file. Although I am absolutely 
convinced that my distinguished colleagues certainly did 
not so intend, the effect of their holding is to weaken and 
undermine labor union effectiveness as envisioned and 




In sum, the abstract injury asserted by the Appellants-- 
the right to be free from any application of Article 78 to 
them--does not meet the threshold requirement that"[a] 
plaintiff must always have suffered a distinct and palpable 
injury to himself that is likely to be redressed if the 
requested relief is granted." Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 
100 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 
Because Article 78 is reasonable as a matter of law, it is 
impossible to discern how Appellants sustained the 
necessary injury entitling them to an injunction restraining 
the future operation of the article. Appellants were not 
prevented from criticizing union policies or from mounting 
effective challenges to union leadership. They were not 
denied an opportunity to work. They were not denied the 
opportunity to express any views, arguments or opinions or 
to express at all meetings of the labor organizations their 
views of candidates in an election of the labor organization 
or of any business properly before the meeting. 
 
Rather, Ruocchio was precluded only from "willfully 
circularizing untrue statements." As punishment for his 
alleged violation of Article 78, he was not expelled from 
membership; he was denied only the opportunity, for 
several months, to exercise his office as treasurer. On 
appeal after trial, he was restored to his office with all full 
privileges and rights. The only injury he sustained was his 
temporary removal from office. Because this was an injury 
as an officer and not as a member, the LMRDA does not 
afford relief. 
 
Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of 
the district court for the foregoing reasons. 
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